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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
 1. Whether the district court erred when it held, 
directly contrary to the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia’s decision in Virginia v. 
Sebelius, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 2991385 
(E.D.Va.), that petitioners’ narrowly-tailored facial 
challenge to the individual mandate provision (Sec-
tion 1501) of the recently passed Health Care Legisla-
tion, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), is not 
justiciable under Article III because that provision 
does not become effective until 2014. 
 2. Whether the individual mandate provision 
in Section 1501 of the Act exceeds Congress’ power 
under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution by 
regulating and taxing a citizen’s decision not to 
participate in interstate commerce (i.e., decision not 
to purchase health care insurance). 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner Pacific Justice 
Institute states that it is a California non-profit 
corporation and enjoys IRC § 501(c)(3) status, with no 
parent or publicly held company controlling any 
interest in Petitioner. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
BEFORE JUDGMENT 
 Mr. Steve Baldwin and the Pacific Justice Insti-
tute petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment 
in a case pending on appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
OPINION BELOW 
 The slip opinion of the district court is reported 
at 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D.Cal.) and is reprinted in the 
Appendix (“App.”) 1-11. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
JURISDICTION 
 The judgment of the district court was entered on 
August 27, 2010. The notice of appeal was timely filed 
on August 30, 2010. The case was docketed in the 
court of appeals on September 1, 2010, as No. 10-
56374. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court is 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1) and 2101(e). 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 The text of Article I, section 8, clause 3 and 
Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution are found in App. 12. The relevant 
sections of the Health Care Legislation (P.L. 111-148 
2 
and P.L. 111-152) at issue in this case are set forth in 
App. 12-16. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 The crux of this case was best stated in advance 
by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) when it analyzed President Clinton’s pro-
posed health care legislation: 
“A mandate requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action. The 
government has never required people to 
buy any good or service as a condition of law-
ful residence in the United States. An indi-
vidual mandate would have two features 
that, in combination, would make it unique. 
First, it would impose a duty on individuals 
as members of society. Second, it would re-
quire people to purchase a specific service 
that would be heavily regulated by the fed-
eral government.” 
See, Congressional Budget Office website, The Budg-
etary Treatment Of An Individual Mandate To Buy 
Health Insurance 1 (1994), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (accessed: September 11, 
2010).  
 More recently, in analyzing the individual man-
date provision of the health care legislation at issue 
in this case, the Congressional Research Service 
3 
expressed the same reservations as those in the 1994 
CBO Report: 
“Despite the breadth of powers that have 
been exercised under the Commerce Clause, 
it is unclear whether the clause would pro-
vide a solid constitutional foundation for leg-
islation containing a requirement to have 
health insurance. Whether such a require-
ment would be constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause is perhaps the most chal-
lenging question posed by such a proposal, as 
it is a novel issue whether Congress may use 
this clause to require an individual to pur-
chase a good or a service.” 
See, Congressional Research Service, Requiring 
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitu-
tional Analysis 3 (2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/ 
rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf (accessed: September 11, 
2010). 
 Furthermore, the Court should keep in mind that 
the overriding principle of limited government is the 
cornerstone of the Constitution, which was articulat-
ed early on by Chief Justice John Marshall in two 
landmark cases: “The powers of the legislature are 
defined and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 
(1803) (“Marbury”). Sixteen years later, Chief Justice 
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Marshall further clarified the principle announced in 
Marbury: 
‘‘This government is acknowledged by all, to 
be one of enumerated powers. The principle, 
that it can exercise only the powers granted 
to it, would seem too apparent, to have re-
quired to be enforced by all those arguments, 
which its enlightened friends, while it was 
depending before the people, found it neces-
sary to urge; that principle is now universal-
ly admitted.’’ 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 
(1819) (“McCulloch”). 
 It is upon this stage that the constitutional 
drama over government imposed health care will 
unfold. 
 On Christmas Eve of 2009, the Senate passed its 
health care bill, which originated under bill number 
H.R. 3590 and which the Senate titled: the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. See, Library of 
Congress, Bills and Resolutions, H.R. 3590, http:// 
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@S 
(accessed: September 11, 2010). 
 On March 21, 2010, the House passed the Senate 
health care bill (H.R. 3590). See, Library of Congress, 
Government Printing Office (“GPO”), H.R. 3590, http:// 
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ148.pdf (accessed: Sep-
tember 11, 2010). 
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 On March 23, 2010, the President signed the 
Senate health care bill (H.R. 3590) into law as P.L. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119. Id. 
 On March 25, 2010, the House passed H.R. 4872, 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010 (“Reconciliation Bill”), which amended the 
Senate Health Care Bill (P.L. 111-148). See, Library 
of Congress, Government Printing Office, H.R. 4872, 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ152.pdf (accessed: 
September 11, 2010). The Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 
4872) is divided into two main parts, one addressing 
health care reform and the other addressing student 
loan reform. 
 On March 30, 2010, the President signed the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
(H.R. 4872) into law as P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
Id. Hereinafter P.L. 111-148, Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010; 124 Stat. 119), as 
amended by P.L. 111-152, Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Mar. 30, 2010; 124 Stat. 
1029) will be referred to collectively as the “Act.” 
 Petitioner Baldwin served in the California 
Assembly for the years 1994 through 2000. During 
his tenure in the California Legislature, he served as 
Minority Whip and as Chairman of the Education 
Committee and served on the Insurance Committee, 
the Health Committee, the Higher Education Com-
mittee, the High Technology Committee, and the 
Revenue and Taxation Committee. (App. 1-2, 18, ¶ 2.) 
6 
 As far as specific legislative areas, Mr. Baldwin 
sponsored legislation creating medical savings ac-
counts; business legislation to reduce taxes or reduce 
regulation; and education reform bills relating to 
phonics, the creation of state-wide academic stand-
ards, charter schools, and vouchers. (App. 19, ¶ 3.) 
 After he completed his tenure in the California 
Legislature in 2000, Mr. Baldwin took the position of 
Executive Director of the Council for National Policy 
(“CFNP”). CFNP is a nonpartisan, educational foun-
dation, whose members are dedicated to the Found-
ing Fathers’ belief in limited government. See, 
Council for National Policy website, About Us, http:// 
www.cfnp.org/Page.aspx?pid=180 (accessed: May 5, 
2010). (App. 19, ¶ 4.) 
 Mr. Baldwin does not consent and objects to 
being compelled by the Act to maintain health care 
insurance. (App. 19, ¶¶ 8 & 9.) 
 Petitioner Pacific Justice Institute is a public 
interest and an education and legal defense organiza-
tion. The areas in which Pacific Justice provides 
education and legal representation include but are 
not limited to: religious liberties; freedom of speech, 
association, and assembly; protection and sanctity of 
human life; parental rights; students’ rights in public 
schools and colleges; religious charities; employees’ 
rights in the workplace; union members’ rights re-
garding contribution to charities. (App. 2, 22, ¶ 2.) 
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 Pacific Justice is an employer and provides 
health care insurance to its employees and relies 
upon tax-deductible, charitable contributions for its 
operating budget. As an employer, Pacific Justice does 
not consent and objects to being compelled to comply 
with the Act because the Act imposes increased costs 
on it by preventing it from denying health care insur-
ance coverage to part-time employees. (App. 23, ¶¶ 7, 
12, & 13.) 
 Respondents are the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Kathleen 
Sebelius as Secretary of the HHS, the Department of 
Labor (“DOL”) and Hilda Solis as Secretary of the 
DOL, and the Department of the Treasury (“DOT”) 
and Timothy Geithner as Secretary of the DOT. 
Respondents are charged with enforcement of the Act. 
(App. 2.) 
 By way of their complaint in the district court, 
Petitioners sought, inter alia, declaratory and/or 
injunctive relief regarding the individual mandate 
provision set forth in Section 1501 of the Act. Section 
1501(b) of the Act adds section 5000A(a) to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (“IRC”), which 
provides:  
“Sec. 5000A(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAIN-
TAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
– An applicable individual shall for each 
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the indi-
vidual who is an applicable individual, is 
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covered under minimum essential coverage 
for such month.” 
 Section 1501(b) of the Act mandates that individ-
uals such as Petitioner Baldwin must maintain 
qualifying health care insurance coverage; otherwise, 
the IRS will impose an ever increasing monetary 
penalty. See, e.g., sections 1501(b) and 10106 of the 
Act. The Act refers to the monetary penalty in two 
different ways, “SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAY-
MENTS” and “PENALTY”: 
‘‘SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAIN-
TAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
 (b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAY-
MENT. –  
  (1) IN GENERAL. – If a taxpayer 
who is an applicable individual, or an appli-
cable individual for whom the taxpayer is li-
able under paragraph (3), fails to meet the 
requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more 
months, then, except as provided in subsec-
tion (e), there is hereby imposed on the tax-
payer a penalty with respect to such failures 
in the amount determined under subsection 
(c). . . .  
  (3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY. – If 
an individual with respect to whom a penalty 
is imposed by this section for any month . . .  
 (c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY. –  
  (1) IN GENERAL. – The amount of 
the penalty imposed by this section on any 
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taxpayer for any taxable year with respect to 
failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall 
be equal to the lesser of . . . ” 
Section 1501(b) of the Act (as amended by section 
10106(b)(1)) (emphasis added).1  
 Thus, the Act compels individuals to perform an 
affirmative act or incur a penalty solely because they 
exist and reside in the United States. The Act is 
directed to inactivity (i.e., citizens who do not pur-
chase health care insurance) that is driven by the 
constitutionally protected liberty of choice of all 
Americans. Furthermore, such inactivity by its very 
nature may not be deemed to be “in commerce” or to 
have any “substantial effect on commerce,” whether 
interstate or otherwise, to properly and constitution-
ally trigger Congress’ Commerce Power under Article 
I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution.2  
 Petitioners filed a motion for preliminary injunc-
tion requesting the district court to enjoin enforce-
ment of the Act. The Respondents countered by filing 
a motion to dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack 
of justiciable claim under Article III. 
 
 1 The specific calculations for each of the full amount of 
penalties imposed by Section 5000A(b) & (c) are set forth in 
detail at App. 13-14. 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: “The Congress shall 
have the power . . . 3. To regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” 
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 Prior to decision by the district court below, on 
August 2, 2010, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia denied the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability 
under Article III, section 2, in a case that also chal-
lenged the individual mandate (Section 1501) of the 
Act. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, ___ 
F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 2991385 (E.D.Va.) (“Virgin-
ia”). 
 On August 27, 2010, the district court denied the 
Petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction and 
granted the Respondents’ motion to dismiss. (App. 1-
11.) 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
 A petition for writ of certiorari before judgment 
in a court of appeals will be granted “only upon a 
showing that the case is of such imperative public 
importance as to justify deviation from normal appel-
late practice and to require immediate determination 
in this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 11.  
 
A. This Case Is Of Imperative National Im-
portance 
 Roscoe Filburn could not have imagined that 
when he decided to plant extra wheat on his small 
farm to feed his livestock and for personal consump-
tion that an ever increasing expansion of federal 
11 
power would be initiated. See, Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (“Wickard”). Since this Court’s 
decision in Wickard, Congress has slowly but inevita-
bly encroached upon every aspect of life in America, 
culminating in the 2,559 page piece of legislation in 
this case that constitutes a federal takeover of the 
health care and health insurance industries.  
 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (“Youngstown”), this Court 
nullified the Executive Branch’s war-time attempt to 
temporarily seize and operate most of the privately 
owned steel mills in the country. More dramatically, 
this Petition calls upon the Court to review an act of 
Congress that permanently nationalizes the health 
care and health care insurance industries, as well as 
compels individual citizens to engage in interstate 
commerce (i.e., to purchase health care insurance).  
 Furthermore, the individual mandate provision 
in Section 1501 of the Act exceeds Congress’ power 
under Article I, section 8, clause 3 (“Commerce 
Clause”). As recently as last term, this Court con-
firmed that Congress is not vested with general police 
powers: “Nor need we fear that our holding today 
confers on Congress a general ‘police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States.’ ” United States v. Comstock, 
560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1964 (2010) (“Com-
stock”). 
 The individual mandate provision in Section 
1501 of the Act conflicts with clear decisions of this 
12 
Court regarding the scope and extent of Congression-
al power. Specifically, in recent decisions of this 
Court, district and circuit courts have been instructed 
that there are limits to Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause to federalize regulation of personal 
conduct. Starting in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 558-59 (1995) (“Lopez”), this Court held that 
Congress has no power to make a federal crime of 
possessing a hand gun within 1,000 feet of a school, 
even if the gun had traveled through interstate 
commerce. Next, in United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000) (“Morrison”), this Court held 
that Congress has no power to fashion a federal 
remedy for claims of violence against women. Finally, 
in a unanimous decision, this Court held that Con-
gress has no power to make a federal crime of arson, 
even if the affected building is subject to a mortgage 
held by a bank in another state. Jones v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (“Jones”). 
 It is important to note that in the foregoing cases, 
this Court imposed stringent limits on Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause relative to per-
sonal conduct. In this case, by way of the Act, Con-
gress is attempting to impose federal regulation of an 
individual’s inaction. Suffice it to say that nowhere 
in the Constitution is Congress vested with power to 
mandate that an individual (such as Baldwin) or 
entity (such as Pacific Justice) enter into a contract to 
purchase a good or service in general, or to purchase 
health care insurance in particular. Furthermore, no 
decision of this Court or other constitutional provision 
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or legal doctrine has ever authorized or upheld such a 
claim of congressional power, not even obliquely. 
Consequently, Congress’ exercise of power under the 
Act is not only unprecedented and unauthorized by 
the Constitution, but also necessarily foreclosed by 
Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, supra. 
 Ironically, even members of the New Deal Era 
Court would blush at such an unrestrained and 
unauthorized exercise of Congressional power. For 
example, in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) this 
Court acknowledged that there are limits to Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause: 
“The authority of the federal government 
may not be pushed to such an extreme as to 
destroy the distinction, which the commerce 
clause itself establishes, between commerce 
‘among the several States’ and the internal 
concerns of a State. That distinction between 
what is national and what is local in the ac-
tivities of commerce is vital to the mainte-
nance of our federal system.” 
Id. at 30. 
 It is clear from the plain language of the Act in 
this case that even Congress realized that it was 
regulating inactivity, which was expressed in its 
findings:  
“FINDINGS. – Congress makes the following 
findings: . . . (2) EFFECTS ON THE NA-
TIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE 
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COMMERCE. – The effects described in this 
paragraph are the following: (A) In the ab-
sence of the requirement [i.e., the individual 
mandate to purchase health insurance], 
some individuals would make an eco-
nomic decision and financial decision to 
forego health insurance coverage . . . ” 
See, Section 1501(a)(2)(A) (as amended by section 
10106(a)) (emphasis added). This constitutes an 
admission by Congress that it is attempting to regu-
late inactivity. Never in the history of the nation 
has the Commerce Power been employed in such a 
manner as to require a person who is otherwise 
inactive to engage in economic activity. However, this 
is the trick being employed: before Congress can 
regulate an activity, such activity must already exist; 
thus, in the Act, Congress commands all citizens to 
engage in economic activity (i.e., purchase health 
insurance), then Congress regulates that activity. The 
obvious danger in ratifying such an exercise of Con-
gressional power is that it would forever alter the 
relationship between the federal government and the 
people, making the former the master of the latter. If 
such an exercise of power were deemed constitution-
al, it would enable Congress to manage anything or 
everything by simply thrusting whatever (or whom-
ever) it chooses into the stream of commerce on its 
own authority. 
 Placing Lopez, Morrison, and Jones aside for a 
moment, the Act still does not survive even when 
considering New Deal Era cases and a 2005 decision 
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of this Court, which stretch the limits of the Com-
merce Clause. For example, in Wickard, this Court 
approved Congress’ regulation of a home farmer’s 
wheat crop that was intended for personal consump-
tion and was not intended to be sold. This Court 
concluded that notwithstanding the intrastate na-
ture of his wheat crop, Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause could still reach this activity: 
“ ‘The commerce power is not confined in its 
exercise to the regulation of commerce 
among the states. It extends to those activi-
ties intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce, or the exertion of the power of 
Congress over it, as to make regulation of 
them appropriate means to the attainment of 
a legitimate end, the effective execution of 
the granted power to regulate interstate 
commerce. . . .’ ” 
Wickard, supra, 317 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added; 
quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 
U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (“Wrightwood Dairy”)). In quot-
ing Wrightwood Dairy, the Wickard Court was again 
acknowledging what has always been and presently 
is the case: the Commerce Clause reaches only inter-
state and intrastate activity not inactivity.  
 More recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005) (“Raich”), this Court rejected a Commerce 
Clause challenge to the Controlled Substance Act 
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(“CSA”).3 The CSA regulated cultivating and pos-
sessing home-grown marijuana, even when done so 
intrastate and with the sanction of California’s medic-
inal marijuana law.4 In Raich, this Court analogized 
the cultivating and possession of marijuana with the 
home farmer in Wickard: 
“Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are 
cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible 
commodity for which there is an established, 
albeit illegal, interstate market. Just as the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed ‘to 
control the volume [of wheat] moving in in-
terstate and foreign commerce in order to 
avoid surpluses . . . ’ and consequently con-
trol the market price, a primary purpose of 
the CSA is to control the supply and demand 
of controlled substances in both lawful and 
unlawful drug markets.” 
Id. at 18-19. Furthermore, in footnote 28, the Court 
sets out additional activities associated with illegal 
drug use and trade, which is instructive: 
“Even respondents acknowledge the exist-
ence of an illicit market in marijuana; in-
deed, Raich has personally participated in 
that market, and Monson expresses a will-
ingness to do so in the future. App. 59, 74, 
87. See also Department of Revenue of Mont. 
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 770, 774, 
 
 3 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
 4 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5. 
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n. 12, and 780, n. 17 (1994) (discussing the 
‘market value’ of marijuana); id., at 790 
(REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting); id., at 792 
(O’CONNOR, J., dissenting); Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (addressing pre-
scription drugs ‘for which there is both a law-
ful and an unlawful market’); Turner v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417, n. 33 (1970) 
(referring to the purchase of drugs on the ‘re-
tail market’).” 
Id. at 18, n. 28. 
 What is important about Raich is that it clearly 
articulated the concept of economic activities, which 
it defined to include: “the production, distribution, 
and consumption of commodities.” Id. at 25. Notice 
that the Court’s use of these verbs necessarily re-
quires activity on the part of the person being regu-
lated. Here, the Act does not regulate anything but 
inaction on the part of citizens. Once the judiciary 
accepts this proposition there is no act that Congress 
could not compel citizens to do. It turns the Constitu-
tion’s limits on federal power into grants of unlimited 
power over citizens. In short, it switches the relative 
positions of the people with the government: govern-
ment’s source of authority is no longer “derived from 
the consent of the governed”5 but from its own inter-
pretation and application of the Constitution.  
 
 5 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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 Furthermore, what predominates in Wickard and 
Raich (as well as all other Commerce Clause cases) is 
that there is some level of economic activity occur-
ring, regardless of whether it occurs interstate or 
intrastate. No such activity is required under the Act 
– the only sine qua non to trigger Congress’ regula-
tion is the inactivity of citizens. A novel concept, but 
not authorized by any decision of this Court or the 
Commerce Clause. 
 What is also unprecedented and a serious con-
cern to liberty is the technique Congress has em-
ployed in the Act in order to invoke its Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction. Specifically, in the first instance 
Congress regulates citizens’ inactivity by command-
ing them to engage in activity (i.e., to purchase health 
care insurance) so that it can subsequently regulate 
that Congressionally created activity. Essentially, it is 
Congress (not individuals) who is creating activity 
and then regulating that very same activity. This is 
Congress placing the cart before the horse, so to 
speak. What is required in order for there to be a 
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause is existing 
economic activity, which is then subjected to regula-
tion by Congress; not congressional creation of activi-
ty from inactivity as is the case with the Act. 
 Obviously, it is evident from section 1501(b) 
of the Act that Congress believes that under the 
Commerce Clause it has unlimited powers, includ- 
ing police powers that are vested in the States. Of 
course, such exercise of power by Congress is not 
authorized under the Commerce Clause. In rejecting 
19 
the government’s position that Congress’ reach under 
the Commerce Clause is essentially boundless, this 
Court in Lopez was quick to conclude that the Com-
merce Clause does not vest Congress with police 
powers: 
“To uphold the Government’s contentions 
here, we would have to pile inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair 
to convert congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States.” 
Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). If 
such a police power were self-vested in Congress, 
then the threat to individual liberty would be grave: 
if one cannot make one’s own health and medical 
decisions, one’s own economic decisions, then liberty 
has ceased to exist. 
 Although the foregoing discussion is brief, there 
can be no serious debate over the imperative public 
importance of the legal issues presented by this case. 
 
B. The District Court’s Decision Conflicts 
With A Decision Of A District Court In The 
Fourth Circuit 
 On August 2, 2010, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued its 
memorandum opinion in Virginia. While Virginia was 
not binding on the district court below, it is instruc-
tive and provides support for Petitioners’ position. In 
particular, as in the case at Bar, at issue in Virginia is 
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the constitutionality of the individual mandate set 
forth in Section 1501(b) of the Act, including Petition-
ers’ arguments in the case at Bar that Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause 
and the Respondents’ argument that the case is not 
justiciable under Article III, sec. 2.6 Virginia, supra, 
at 4. 
 In denying the federal defendant’s motion to 
dismiss in Virginia, the Honorable Henry E. Hudson 
found that: 
“The issues presented are purely legal and 
further development of the factual record 
would not clarify the issues for judicial reso-
lution. . . . Neither the White House nor Con-
gress has given any indication that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision [i.e., 
the individual mandate] at issue will not be 
enforced, and the Court sees no reason to as-
sume otherwise. The issues in this case are 
fully framed, the underlying facts are well 
settled, and the case is accordingly ripe for 
review. The Commonwealth has therefore sat-
isfied all requirements of Article III standing” 
Id. at 7-8. 
 Consistent with the Petitioners’ position through-
out the proceedings in the case at Bar, Judge Hudson 
  
 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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articulated that Congress has sailed into new consti-
tutional waters regarding the individual mandate: 
“No specifically articulated constitutional au-
thority exists to mandate the purchase of 
health insurance or the assessment of a pen-
alty for failing to do so.” 
Id. at 12. Interestingly, during oral argument in 
Virginia, Secretary Sebelius admitted as much and 
more: 
“The Secretary appeared to concede during 
oral argument, however, that if the ability to 
require the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision is not within the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution, [then] the penalty necessari-
ly fails . . . ”  
Id. at 16. As admitted by the Assistant Attorney 
General during oral argument, “if it [i.e., the individ-
ual mandate] is unconstitutional, then the penalty 
would fail as well.” Id. 
 Moreover, in Virginia (as in the case at Bar), the 
federal defendant made the objection that the indi-
vidual mandate does not become effective until 2014. 
However, Judge Hudson dispatched this argument, 
driving home the principle that Congress cannot 
insulate itself merely by postponing the starting date 
while spending the next four years revving up the 
engine: 
“While the mandatory compliance provisions 
of the Minimum Essential Coverage Provi-
sion do not go into effect until 2014, that does 
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not mean that its effects will not be felt by the 
Commonwealth in the near future. This pro-
vision will compel scores of people who are 
not currently enrolled to evaluate and con-
tract for insurance coverage. Individuals cur-
rently insured will be required to be sure that 
their present plans comply with this regulato-
ry regimen. Insurance carriers will have to 
take steps in the near future to accommodate 
the influx of new enrollees to public and pri-
vate insurance plans. Employers will need to 
determine if their current insurance satisfies 
the statutory requirements.” 
Id. at 16. 
 Even after having the benefit of Virginia (a copy 
of the opinion was filed as supplemental authority), 
the district court below held to the contrary, conclud-
ing that Petitioners’ claims were not justiciable under 
Article III, section 2 because the individual mandate 
does not become effective until 2014. Accordingly, the 
district court denied the Petitioners’ motion for pre-
liminary injunction and granted the Respondents’ 
motion to dismiss. (App. 11.) 
 Typically when a party petitions for certiorari it 
is best to demonstrate that a conflict exists at the 
circuit (rather than district) court level. However, 
due to the magnitude of the impact of the Act on the 
economy and the health care and health insurance 
industries, as well as the fact that a significant 
portion of the Act is in effect and is already being 
implemented in all other respects, this Court should 
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intervene now to determine the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate provision. As the conflict now 
exists within the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the 
holding and effect of these two rulings further sup-
ports this Court’s intervention to ensure a uniform 
resolution and application of the Act.  
 Regarding the Article III injury sustained by the 
existence of the individual mandate, the district court 
held: 
“As to Plaintiff Baldwin, he does not indicate 
whether he has health insurance or not. But 
that is of no moment because, even if he does 
not have insurance at this time, he may well 
satisfy the minium [sic] coverage provision of 
the Act by 2014: he may take a job that offers 
health insurance, or qualify for Medicaid or 
Medicare, or he may choose to purchase 
health insurance before the effective date of 
the Act.” 
(App. 7.) This completely misses the mark, as Virgin-
ia clearly recognized the extensive complexity that is 
created by the demands of the individual mandate. 
For example, in Virginia the court noted that action is 
required of all people regardless of the oversimplified 
question of whether they have or do not have health 
care insurance. 
 As set forth above, Virginia contradicts the 
district court below, because it found that the indi-
vidual mandate provision has already caused: mil-
lions of citizens to alter or commence altering their 
positions regarding health insurance coverage; the 
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entire health care and health care insurance indus-
tries to commence restructuring; and employers (such 
as petitioner Pacific Justice) to analyze compliance 
requirements and start restructuring. Virginia, 
supra, at 16. 
 Another point made in the district court by 
Petitioners is that enforcement of the individual 
mandate is inevitable, as it is required by section 
1501(b) of the Act. Moreover, there is nothing abstract 
about this section of the Act; nor will this Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction violate the principle underly-
ing the Ripeness Doctrine, which is designed: 
“ . . . to prevent the courts, through prema-
ture adjudication, from entangling them-
selves in abstract disagreements.” 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 
(1967) (“Abbott”). Consistent with the principles 
announced in Abbott, the individual mandate is 
neither an abstraction nor a disagreement, but rather 
is an actual and clear inevitability. Further, this case 
is not a situation where Petitioners’ claims are vague 
and “contingent future events that may not occur as 
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 
568, 580-81 (1985) (“Union Carbide”).  
 Since the issues raised in this Petition are purely 
legal, there is no further factual development re-
quired in order for this Court to make a determina-
tion on the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate (a point made in Virginia, pp. 7-8). Stated 
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another way, the dictates of the individual mandate 
are clearly set forth in section 1501(b) and are self-
executing, to wit: individuals must maintain a Con-
gressionally mandated amount of health care insur-
ance. Furthermore, this Court has developed a 
prudential component of the Ripeness Doctrine, 
which supports that a pre-enforcement determination 
of the individual mandate may be made by this Court 
at this time. See, e.g., Duke Power Company v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 
59 (1978) (“Duke Power”). In Duke Power, this Court 
found the Ripeness Doctrine was not a bar to a pre-
enforcement challenge, even where no nuclear acci-
dent had yet occurred (i.e., it was an uncertain, 
future event – the same argument rejected in Duke 
Power is now being made by Respondents in the case 
at Bar): 
“The prudential considerations embodied in 
the ripeness doctrine also argue strongly in 
favor for a prompt resolution of the claims 
presented. Although it is true that no nuclear 
accident has yet occurred and that such an 
occurrence would eliminate much of the ex-
isting scientific uncertainty surrounding this 
subject, it would not, in our view, signifi-
cantly advance our ability to deal with 
the legal issues presented nor aid us in 
their resolution . . . Since we are persuad-
ed that ‘we will be in no better a position 
later than we are now’ to decide [the 
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constitutional] question, we hold that it 
is presently ripe for adjudication.” 
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).  
 As in the district court, Respondents will not 
provide any explanation as to how this Court would 
be in any better a position in 2014 than it is presently 
to decide the serious and substantial constitutional 
questions relating to the individual mandate. Moreo-
ver, here, as in Duke Power, prudence dictates that 
before the health care and health insurance indus-
tries are transformed from private entities to agents 
of the federal government and trillions of dollars are 
spent, the constitutionality of the Act’s cornerstone, 
the individual mandate, should be decided now rather 
than in four years. Id. 
 Finally, Petitioners respectfully suggest that a 
fair and constitutional application of the foregoing 
cases under Article III would support this Court’s 
finding of justiciability in this case because the: 
 1. claims are purely legal (here the claims rest 
on pre-enforcement, facial challenge to the Act); 
 2. challenged provision of the Act presents a 
clear constitutional violation (in this case the indi-
vidual mandate provision exceeds Congress’ power 
under Article I, sec. 8, cl. 3, i.e., the Commerce 
Clause); 
 3. enforcement of an indispensible section of 
the challenged act of Congress is not only inevitable 
but indispensible to implement the purpose of the 
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legislation (e.g., the individual mandate is the corner-
stone and Congressional justification for the entire 
Act);  
 4. delay in resolving the constitutional ques-
tions does not place this Court in a better position 
than if they were immediately addressed (here, as in 
Duke Power, delaying review of the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate serves no prudential con-
sideration under the Ripeness Doctrine); and  
 5. issues raised are of imperative national 
importance and prompt resolution of the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate provision would 
serve the public interest (e.g., in this case the Act 
takes control of one-sixth of the U.S. economy by 
nationalizing the health care and health insurance 
industries and the spending of trillions of dollars). 
 The foregoing demonstrates that this Court’s 
intervention at this point is appropriate in order to 
resolve the conflict within the circuits, especially in 
light of the imperative importance of the issues raised 
in this case. 
 
C. The Act Does Not Include A Severability 
Clause, And, Therefore, Any Doubt As To 
The Constitutionality Of The Individual 
Mandate Provision Should Be Immediately 
Resolved By This Court 
 Although the challenge presented by this Petition 
is narrowly tailored, the impact of the individual 
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mandate provision being held to be unconstitutional 
would be so broad that it requires this Court’s imme-
diate attention and analysis. This is because the Act 
does not have a severability clause to save the re-
maining provisions in the event the Court holds that 
the individual mandate provision is unconstitutional. 
 Absent a severability clause, which would enable 
the Court to strike down one provision without im-
pacting the effectiveness of the rest of the Act, the 
need for a constitutional determination by this Court 
of the individual mandate provision is not only au-
thorized but necessary. The interplay between provi-
sions and the overall effectiveness of any act of 
Congress must be determined. For example: 
“Congress could not have intended a consti-
tutionally flawed provision to be severed 
from the remainder of the statute if the bal-
ance of the legislation is incapable of func-
tioning independently.”  
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). 
Furthermore, it must be determined “whether [after 
removing the invalid provision] the [remaining] 
statute will function in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress.” Id. at 685 (original emphasis 
omitted). 
 Two indicators point to the intent of Congress for 
the Act to be without a severability clause. First, 
Congress specifically removed a severability clause 
where it had previously existed in an earlier version 
of the Act. Second, the Act cannot function properly 
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independent of the individual mandate. For example, 
in its findings in support of the Act, Congress argued 
that provisions that prohibit the denial of coverage 
based on preexisting conditions are balanced by the 
individual mandate, which will “broaden the health 
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, 
which will lower health insurance premiums.” Section 
1501(a)(2)(I) of the Act (as amended by section 
10106(a)). 
 This expression of Congressional intent demon-
strates that the individual mandate provision is 
meant to work in concert with the rest of the Act and 
supports the fact that it neither has nor was intended 
to have a severability clause. Accordingly, the destiny 
of the Act itself is inextricably intertwined with the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision.  
 In light of the staggering amount of investments 
of time and money being made, the restructuring of 
the health care and health care insurance industries, 
and the impact on private employers as a result of 
passage of the Act, this Court’s determination of the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision 
is necessary at this time. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons the petition for writ of 
certiorari before judgment in the court of appeals 
should be GRANTED. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER D. LEPISCOPO 
 Counsel of Record 
Counsel for Petitioners 
 Steve Baldwin and 
 Pacific Justice Institute 
September 15, 2010. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
STEVE BALDWIN and 
PACIFIC JUSTICE 
INSTITUTE, 
    Plaintiffs, 
  vs. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
et al., 
    Defendants. 
CASE NO. 10CV1033
 DMS (WMC) 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 
MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
[Docs. 6 & 22] 
 
 Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction. For the reasons set forth below, Defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs’ 
motion for preliminary injunction is denied. 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs Steve Baldwin and the Pacific Justice 
Institute have filed suit seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief based upon their challenge to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010), as amend-
ed by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Mar. 
30, 2010) (collectively the “Act”). Plaintiff Baldwin is 
a former member of the California Assembly and is a 
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“devout and practicing Christian.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17.) 
Plaintiff Pacific Justice Institute is an education and 
legal defense organization which primarily represents 
Christians and Christian organizations. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-
30.) Pacific Justice Institute is an employer and it 
provides health insurance to its employees. (Id. at 
¶ 27.) Defendants are the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Kathleen 
Sebelius as Secretary of the HHS, the Department of 
Labor (“DOL”) and Hilda Solis as Secretary of the 
DOL, and the Department of the Treasury (“DOT”) 
and Timothy Geithner as Secretary of the DOT. 
 The Act was signed into law in March 2010, 
following lengthy public debate and discussion re-
garding the issue of health care reform. One of the 
key provisions challenged by Plaintiffs is a require-
ment that, beginning in 2014, individuals, with 
certain exceptions, must maintain a minimum level of 
health insurance coverage or pay a penalty. Pub. L. 
No. 111-148 §§ 1501, 10106, amended by Pub. L. No. 
111-152 § 1002. The Act also requires employers of a 
certain size to provide health insurance for their 
employees or pay a penalty. See Pub. L. No. 111-148 
§ 1513. Plaintiffs object to being compelled to comply 
with these provisions of the Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 47-
49.) 
 Plaintiffs allege the Act is unconstitutional 
because Congress lacks authority under the Com-
merce Clause to require individuals and employers to 
purchase health insurance. Plaintiffs also allege 
Congress acted outside the scope of its enumerated 
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powers in passing the Act, the penalty imposed for 
failure to purchase health insurance is a direct tax 
that was not apportioned among the states according 
to census data, and the revenue raising provisions of 
the Act did not originate in the House of Representa-
tives. Baldwin further alleges the individual mandate 
of the Act violates his right to privacy and his physi-
cian-patient privilege. 
 In addition to the individual mandate and em-
ployer responsibility provisions, Plaintiffs challenge 
several other aspects of the Act. For example, Plain-
tiffs allege Secretary Sebelius failed to comply with 
Section 1552 of the Act, which required her, within 30 
days after enactment of the Act, to “publish on the 
Internet website of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, a list of all of the authorities pro-
vided to the Secretary under this Act (and the 
amendments made by this Act).” Pub. L. No. 111-148 
§ 1552. Plaintiff Baldwin also raises a claim for 
violation of the Equal Protection clause. Specifically, 
Baldwin alleges he has health issues related to his 
prostate and desires increased research in men’s 
health, including in the areas of prostate health and 
prostate cancer. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Baldwin contends the 
Act is discriminatory because it creates several 
Offices of Women’s Health, with unlimited monetary 
appropriations, without corresponding Offices of 
Men’s Health. (Comp. ¶¶ 161-168.) 
 Finally, Plaintiffs are concerned that public funds 
will be used for abortion. Following enactment of the 
Act, the President of the United States signed an 
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executive order “to establish an adequate enforce-
ment mechanism to ensure that Federal funds are 
not used for abortion services.” Exec. Order No. 
13,535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 24, 2010). The 
Executive Order “maintains current Hyde Amend-
ment restrictions governing abortion policy and 
extends those restrictions to the newly created health 
insurance exchanges.” Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs 
fear public funds will be used for abortions, (Compl. 
¶¶ 18, 36), and seek a declaration prohibiting such 
use of public funds. 
 Plaintiffs filed suit on May 14, 2010, and soon 
thereafter sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act. 
(Docs. 1, 3 & 6.) On June 10, 2010, this Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order on 
grounds that Plaintiffs had not shown such relief was 
necessary prior to the hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion. (June 10, 2010 Order at 2.) On June 25, 2010, 
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 25.) 
The parties agreed to combine the motions, and to 
submit the motions without oral argument. (Docs. 20 
& 32.) On August 2, 2010, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled on a 
motion to dismiss in Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Sebelius, et. al., No. 3:10-cv-188-HEH, a case which 
also challenges the Act. The parties submitted sup-
plemental briefing on the issues raised in that case. 
(Docs. 34-36.) 
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II. 
DISCUSSION 
 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants con-
tend Plaintiffs lack standing to sue because they have 
not adequately alleged an injury-in-fact, Plaintiffs’ 
claims are not ripe, and the claims are barred by the 
Anti-Injunction Act. Defendants also move to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. De-
fendants correctly argue Plaintiffs lack standing, and 
as that issue is dispositive, the balance of Defendants’ 
argument are not addressed. 
 To establish the “irreducible constitutional 
minium [sic] of standing” under Article III, § 2 of the 
United States Constitution, Plaintiffs must demon-
strate: (1) an “ ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particu-
larized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical,” (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 
action of the defendant, and (3) it is likely the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A 
particularized injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff 
in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 561 n. 1. 
Standing “requires federal courts to satisfy them-
selves that ‘the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to war- 
rant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.’ ” 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149, 
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___ U.S. ___ (2009) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 498-499 (1975) (original emphasis). 
 A plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement 
if he or she suffers “some threatened or actual injury 
resulting from the putatively illegal action.” Scott v. 
Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 656 (9th 
Cir. Cal. 2002) (quotations omitted). Allegations of 
future injury will satisfy the requirement “only if [the 
plaintiff] ‘is immediately in danger of sustaining some 
direct injury as the result of the challenged official 
conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (original emphasis). Further, 
“a plaintiff raising only a generally available griev-
ance about government – claiming only harm to his 
and every citizen’s interest in proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no 
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does 
the public at large – does not state an Article III case 
or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see also 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United 
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 
(1982) (discussing prudential standing considerations 
and noting that “the Court has refrained from adjudi-
cating ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ 
which amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ pervasively 
shared and most appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches.”). Plaintiffs bear the burden 
of establishing standing, Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149, 
and as discussed below, fail to meet their burden. 
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 In Claims One through Four of the Complaint, 
Plaintiffs allege Congress violated several constitu-
tional provisions when instituting the individual 
mandate and employer responsibility provisions of 
the Act. Plaintiffs, however, do not allege any particu-
larized injury stemming from the Act. The employer 
responsibility provision applies to employers with at 
least 50 full time equivalent employees. Pub. L. No. 
111-148 § 1513(d)(2)(A). Pacific Justice makes no 
allegation that it has, or will have, 50 full time em-
ployees at the time the mandate takes effect. Further, 
even if the Act applied to Plaintiff, Pacific Justice 
already provides health insurance to its employees. 
Its current coverage may satisfy the requirements 
under the Act when it goes into effect; however it is 
impossible to know now whether or not Plaintiff will 
be subject to or compliant with the Act in 2014. As to 
Plaintiff Baldwin, he does not indicate whether he 
has health insurance or not. But that is of no moment 
because, even if he does not have insurance at this 
time, he may well satisfy the minium [sic] coverage 
provision of the Act by 2014: he may take a job that 
offers health insurance, or qualify for Medicaid or 
Medicare, or he may choose to purchase health insur-
ance before the effective date of the Act. 
 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue they have standing 
because the provisions of the Act are certain to take 
effect in 2014 and the record before the Court would 
not benefit from further factual review. These argu-
ments, however, ignore the requirement of an injury 
in fact. While Plaintiffs state they “do not consent to 
App. 8 
being compelled to comply” with the Act, they cannot 
manufacture standing by withholding their consent to 
the law. While Plaintiffs object to the mandate to 
purchase health insurance, they have not shown they 
would be subject to any penalty as a result of the Act. 
To the extent Plaintiffs seek relief because “Con-
gress[’s] and the President’s failure to pass constitu-
tionally sound heath [sic] care legislation undermines 
the rule of law,” Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3, Plaintiffs 
are simply airing generalized grievances that the 
Court is precluded from adjudicating. Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 573-74. Accordingly, Claims One through Four are 
dismissed for lack of standing. 
 Next, in Claims Six and Seven, Baldwin alleges 
the individual mandate of the Act violates his right of 
privacy because it interferes with his “right to be free 
from unwanted and unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person such as the decision whether and to what 
extent to subject one’s own body to medical treatment 
or being compelled by the government to maintain 
health insurance.” (Compl. ¶ 136.) Baldwin further 
alleges that several provisions of the Act require him 
to provide a broad range of personal and private 
information, which violates his privacy rights and 
physician-patient privilege. (Id. at ¶¶ 134, 147-149.) 
 Here again, Plaintiffs do not cite any provision of 
the Act which forces Baldwin to submit to unwanted 
medical treatment, nor is there any allegation that 
Baldwin’s decisions regarding medical treatment 
have been affected by the Act. Simply put, Baldwin 
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fails to allege a particularized injury stemming from 
violation of his privacy rights. If he has health insur-
ance, the provisions of the Act may well have no affect 
on him; if he does not have insurance, he alleges no 
facts that he would not purchase health insurance in 
2014, but for the requirements of the Act. 
 Baldwin further objects to “being compelled by 
sections 1002, 1331, 1441, 3015, and 3504 of the Act 
to provide a broad range of personal and private 
marital, tax, financial, health, and/or medical related 
information; nor did he consent to this information 
being collected, aggregated, integrated, and dissemi-
nated by and between the federal government, state 
and local governments, and private entities.” (Compl. 
¶¶ 134, 147.) But Plaintiff does not, nor can he at this 
time, allege that he has been compelled by the Act to 
provide personal information, that his personal 
information has been used improperly, or that use of 
his personal information has in any way eroded his 
physician-patient privilege.1 Plaintiffs’ Sixth and 
Seventh claims are therefore dismissed for lack of 
standing. 
 Next, Plaintiffs allege in their Fifth claim for 
relief that Secretary Sebelius failed to comply with 
 
  1 Notably, there is no cause of action for violation of an 
evidentiary privilege. See In re Madison Guar. S&L Ass’n, 173 
F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“We know of no authority, and 
indeed perceive no logic, that would support the proposition that 
the Rules of Evidence create any cause of action or ever provide 
standing.”). 
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Section 1552 of the Act by failing to publish certain 
information on the HHS website. Yet, Plaintiffs do not 
allege an injury stemming from this alleged failure. 
This claim is therefore dismissed for lack of standing. 
 Next, Baldwin alleges in his Eighth claim for 
relief that the Act created five Offices of Women’s 
Health. Baldwin contends that since the Act did not 
create corresponding Offices for Men’s Health, the Act 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution. Defendants point out that the 
Offices of Women’s Health existed prior to the crea-
tion of the Act. Again, Plaintiff has failed to demon-
strate that the Act has caused him injury. 
 Finally, in Claim Nine of their complaint, Plain-
tiffs seek a declaration that public funds may not be 
used for abortions. Plaintiffs argue that despite the 
Hyde Amendment and the Executive Order which 
“maintains current Hyde Amendment restrictions 
governing abortion policy and extends those re-
strictions to the newly created health insurance 
exchanges,” loopholes exist and community health 
centers may nevertheless use public funds for abor-
tions. Plaintiffs object to public funds being used for 
abortion. Plaintiffs’ objection, however, states only a 
generalized grievance. Because no particularized 
injury is alleged, nor is there any allegation that 
public funds actually have been used for abortions, 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to assert 
this claim. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice and 
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is denied. 
Because Plaintiffs’ claims fail on standing grounds, 
the Court declines to reach other issues raised in the 
briefs. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint on or 
before September 10, 2010. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 27, 2010 
 /s/ Dana M. Sabraw
  HON. DANA M. SABRAW
United States District Judge 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Congress shall have the power . . . 3. To 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indi-
an tribes. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
CASE OR CONTROVERSY – JUSTICIABLE CASES 
Section 2. 1. The Judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising un-
der this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority; – to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls; – to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies 
to which the United States shall be a Party; 
– to Controversies between two or more 
States; between a State and Citizens of an-
other State; between Citizens of different 
States, – between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Land under Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE 
HEALTH CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148 AND 111-152) 
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS: 
FINDINGS. – Congress makes the following 
findings: . . . (2) EFFECTS ON THE NA-
TIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE. – The effects described in this 
paragraph are the following:  
  (A) The requirement regulates activity 
that is commercial and economic in nature: 
economic and financial decisions about how 
and when health care is paid for, and when 
health insurance is purchased. In the ab-
sence of the requirement, some individuals 
would make an economic and financial deci-
sion to forego health insurance coverage and 
attempt to self-insure, which increases fi-
nancial risks to households and medical pro-
viders. 
*    *    * 
  (I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the 
Public Health Service Act (as added by sec-
tion 1201 of this Act), if there were no re-
quirement, many individuals would wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed 
care. By significantly increasing health in-
surance coverage, the requirement, together 
with the other provisions of this Act, will 
minimize this adverse selection and broaden 
the health insurance risk pool to include 
healthy individuals, which will lower health 
insurance premiums. The requirement is 
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essential to creating effective health insur-
ance markets in which improved health in-
surance products that are guaranteed issue 
and do not exclude coverage of preexisting 
conditions can be sold. 
Section 1501(a)(2)(A) & (I) of the Act (as amended by 
section 10106(a)). 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE: 
Sec. 5000A(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAIN-
TAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
– An applicable individual shall for each 
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the indi-
vidual who is an applicable individual, is 
covered under minimum essential coverage 
for such month. 
Section 1501(b) of the Act. 
MONETARY PENALTIES: 
SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAIN-
TAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
*    *    * 
  (b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAY-
MENT. –  
    (1) IN GENERAL. – If a taxpayer 
who is an applicable individual, or an appli-
cable individual for whom the taxpayer is 
liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the 
App. 15 
requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more 
months, then, except as provided in subsec-
tion (e), there is hereby imposed on the tax-
payer a penalty with respect to such failures 
in the amount determined under subsection 
(c). . . .  
*    *    * 
    (3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY. – If 
an individual with respect to whom a penalty 
is imposed by this section for any month . . .  
  (c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY. –  
    (1) IN GENERAL. – The amount of 
the penalty imposed by this section on any 
taxpayer for any taxable year with respect to 
failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall 
be equal to the lesser of –  
      (A) the sum of the monthly 
penalty amounts determined under para-
graph (2) for months in the taxable year dur-
ing which 1 or more such failures occurred, 
or 
      (B) an amount equal to the na-
tional average premium for qualified health 
plans which have a bronze level of coverage, 
provide coverage for the applicable family 
size involved, and are offered through Ex-
changes for plan years beginning in the cal-
endar year with or within which the taxable 
year ends. 
    (2) MONTHLY PENALTY 
AMOUNTS. – For purposes of paragraph 
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(1)(A), the monthly penalty amount with re-
spect to any taxpayer for any month during 
which any failure described in subsection 
(b)(1) occurred is an amount equal to 1/12 of 
the greater of the following amounts: 
      (A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT. 
– An amount equal to the lesser of –  
        (i) the sum of the applica-
ble dollar amounts for all individuals with 
respect to whom such failure occurred during 
such month, or 
        (ii) 300 percent of the ap-
plicable dollar amount (determined without 
regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar 
year with or within which the taxable year 
ends. 
      (B) PERCENTAGE OF IN-
COME. – An amount equal to the following 
percentage of the taxpayer’s household in-
come for the taxable year: 
        (i) 0.5 percent for taxable 
years beginning in 2014. 
        (ii) 1.0 percent for taxable 
years beginning in 2015. 
        (iii) 2.0 percent for taxable 
years beginning after 2015. 
Section 1501(b) of the Act (as amended by section 
10106(b)(1)).  
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STEVE BALDWIN and 
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  v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
in her official capacity as 
Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health 
and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES; 
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Department of Labor; 
UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR; 
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, 
in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the United 
States Department of the 
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DECLARATION OF STEVE BALDWIN 
(Filed May 19, 2010) 
 I, Steve Baldwin, declare as follows: 
 1. I am a plaintiff in this action and I reside 
within the County of San Diego. I am over the age of 
eighteen and have personal knowledge of the herein 
stated matters, and, if called upon as a witness, could 
and would testify competently and accurately to the 
herein stated matters. 
 2. I served in the California Assembly for the 
years 1994 through 2000, at which time I was termed-
out under California’s Term Limits law. During my 
tenure in the California Legislature, I served as Mi-
nority Whip and as Chairman of the Education Com-
mittee and served on the Insurance Committee, the 
Health Committee, the Higher Education Committee, 
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the High Technology Committee, and the Revenue 
and Taxation Committee. 
 3. As far as specific legislative areas, I spon-
sored legislation creating medical savings accounts; 
business legislation to reduce taxes or reduce regu-
lation; and education reform bills relating to phonics, 
the creation of state-wide academic standards, char-
ter schools, and vouchers. 
 4. After I completed my tenure in the California 
Legislature in 2000, I took the position of Executive 
Director of the Council for National Policy (“CFNP”). 
CFNP is a nonpartisan, educational foundation, 
whose members are dedicated to the Founding 
Fathers’ belief in limited government. See, Council 
for National Policy website, About Us, http://www. 
cfnp.org/Page.aspx?pid=180 (accessed: May 5, 2010). 
*    *    * 
 8. I do not consent to being compelled by the Act 
to maintain health care insurance, as Congress has 
added police powers to the Enumerated Powers set 
forth in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 
 9. I object to the Act’s provisions compelling me 
to maintain health care insurance because they 
violate my right to privacy protected under the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights. 
*    *    * 
 I declare, under penalty of perjury under the 
laws of the State of California and the United States 
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of America, that the foregoing is true and correct and 
is of my own personal knowledge, and indicate such 
below by my signature executed on this 17th day of 
May, 2010, in the County of Sacramento, State of 
California. 
 /s/ Steve Baldwin
  Steve Baldwin
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the United States 
Department of Labor; 
UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, in his offi-
cial capacity as Secretary 
of the United States 
Department of the Treas-
ury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY; and DOES 1 
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DECLARATION OF BRAD DACUS 
(Filed May 19, 2010) 
 I, Brad Dacus, declare as follows: 
 1. I am the president of plaintiff Pacific Justice 
Institute (“Pacific Justice”). I am over the age of 
eighteen and have personal knowledge of the herein 
stated matters, and, if called upon as a witness, could 
and would testify competently and accurately to the 
herein stated matters. 
 2. Pacific Justice is a public interest and an 
education and legal defense organization. The areas 
in which Pacific Justice provides education and legal 
representation include but are not limited to: reli-
gious liberties; freedom of speech, association, and 
assembly; protection and sanctity of human life; 
App. 23 
parental rights; students’ rights in public schools and 
colleges; religious charities; employees’ rights in the 
workplace; union members’ rights regarding contribu-
tion to charities. 
*    *    * 
 7. Pacific Justice is an employer and provides 
health care insurance to its employees and relies 
upon tax-deductible, charitable contributions for its 
operating budget. 
*    *    * 
 12. As an employer, Pacific Justice does not 
consent to being compelled to comply with the Act, as 
the Act imposes increased costs on it by compelling 
employer health plans and employer health insurance 
providers to insure employees’ dependent unmarried 
children for extended period of time (until age 26). 
 13. As an employer, Pacific Justice does not 
consent to being compelled to comply with the Act 
because the Act imposes increased costs on it by 
preventing it from denying health care insurance 
coverage to part-time employees. 
 I declare, under penalty of perjury under the 
laws of the State of California and the United States 
of America, that the foregoing is true and correct and 
is of my own personal knowledge, and indicate such 
below by my signature executed on this 17th day of 
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May, 2010, in the County of Sacramento, State of 
California. 
 /s/ Brad Dacus
  Brad Dacus
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